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The Alliance concurs with the paper on Visioning the
Future of the CGIAR (WG 1) on a number of points.
The global agricultural research landscape has
evolved significantly over the recent past.
Furthermore, the type of science required to address
the challenges that agricultural research for
development has not yet solved is increasingly more
complex and heterogeneous. Consequently, the
CGIAR needs to 'revise its modes of operation to
engage more effectively with the expanding range of
partners, in both the South and the North, in the
emerging global agricultural research and knowledge
system' (WG 1, Visioning the Future p. 12).
This need to re-position the CGIAR was also
highlighted by the World Development Report (2007,
p.170), when it stressed that the global system today
is very different from that in the days of the Green
Revolution. 
"Collective action and partnerships involving a variety
of actors in an innovation systems framework are
emerging as important. Such a framework recognizes
multiple sources of innovation, and multiple actors as
developers and users of technologies, in a two-way
(nonlinear) interaction. Such systems have many
advantages. They can pool complementary assets
such as intellectual property, genetic resources and
research tools. They can reap economies of scale
and scope. They can facilitate technology transfers
through arrangements with private input distributors.
They can promote integrated value chains. And they
can foster mechanisms to express consumer and
farmer demands for technology and product traits."
The Alliance totally agrees that collective action and
partnerships will become yet more and more
important.
It also agrees with the new core functions of the
CGIAR identified by WG 1:
? Conduct strategic research for development, a
'heartland' function which underpins the other 
functions below. 
? Conserve core collections of germplasm and 
related knowledge.
? Catalyze research and innovation, working 
with partners, convening, networking, 
facilitating spill-over and scaling-up of 
innovations.
? Raise awareness, including 
anticipation/foresight, providing sound scientific 
data or studies for raising awareness among 
both the public and key decision makers.
? Support for policy and decision making to 
respond to increasing demand from 
decision makers at global, regional and 
national levels. 
? Capacity development as a contribution to the 
global agricultural research and knowledge 
system.
The Alliance discussed the new business model
required to re-position the CGIAR along these new
lines, as well as current System bottlenecks and
inefficiencies. The Alliance consequently agreed on a
set of principles that must drive the current change
process. It discussed three scenarios based on these
principles. Further work is needed to fully flesh out all
scenarios as a number of issues have not been
discussed. 
This paper presents the principles the Alliance
considers as prerequisites for a successful
redesigning of the system and it outlines the
Alliance's preferred scenario and two alternatives.
1. Principles for improving efficiency and 
impact in the CGIAR System
To address current inefficiencies in the System and
effectively re-position the CGIAR, the Alliance
considers that changes must be aligned with the
following principles:
? Position the system clearly as a global 
research network in the context of all the other 
actors in international agricultural research for 
development;
? Simplify the system, to decrease its 
bureaucracy and make it less costly to 
operate; change should lead to a clearer and 
cheaper System, more responsive to external 
demands and which can rapidly make 
decisions in a transparent an unambiguous 
manner; 
? Improve quality and effectiveness of decisions
through subsidiarity. Decision-making must 
take place at the most appropriate level and 
location. Over-centralization in research 
management decisions provides an 
unfavourable environment for scientific 
innovation;
? Ensure a clear division of roles and 
responsibilities between funders and providers 
of science-based results, with clearer mutual 
accountability; this two way accountability 
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should be based upon performance and 
results; 
? Institutionalize collective action to decrease its 
transaction costs; currently the System 
provides disincentives for collective action;
? Effectively manage volatility in funding by 
requiring long term financial commitments from 
donors; 
? Increase the effectiveness of the scientific 
teams producing results: decrease 
unnecessary transaction costs (e.g., 
consolidate all accountability and reporting 
requirements), remove bottlenecks and 
disincentives to collaboration;  
? Remove the parts of the system that do not 
have a role in the new model.
Changes should be implemented with due regard for
the balance between short term and long term
transaction costs and benefits and with the objective
to urgently address current inefficiencies whilst better
positioning the System. 
2. Scenario A
This is the scenario preferred by the Alliance.
The building blocks in this scenario are a Donor
Council, a "New Partnership Board", the System
within its international context and the Centres.
Diagram 1 provides a schematic representation. In
this scenario donor sovereignty is not total (donors
agree to the creation of an IFAR and of a New
Partnership Board); likewise Centres’ autonomy is
limited by the prerogatives of this New Partnership
Board. Independent scientific advice is provided to
the System by an independent scientific committee,
which responds to specific requests from the New
Partnership Board. Decision-making is formal, with
clear accountability lines. 
Elements of the current System which disappear are:
the current form of Science Council and SC
Secretariat, the current System Office (Secretariat of
the CGIAR, Alliance Office, and System Office units),
ExCo and AGM. An independent scientific committee
with a clear accountability line to the New Partnership
Board is created, with functions focused on
independent scientific advice to the system. A
Corporate Office is created, with functions which are
broader than those of the System Office. ExCo
meetings are replaced by meetings of the New
Partnership Board, which are run professionally. AGM
is replaced by a general stakeholder consultation
every three years.
The Donor Council
This Council is constituted by donors to the System
who have committed more than $0.5m per year to a
multi year replenishment fund or IFAR type of
mechanism. Donors of restricted funds may be invited
to participate in the discussions.
The Donor Council has the following functions:
? Agree on an overall vision and strategic 
objectives for the System;
? Put in place and provide oversight to a 
replenishment mechanism for all unrestricted 
funds to the System (an international fund for 
agricultural research – IFAR – type of 
mechanism);
? Members of the Council commit, on a 
voluntary basis, to multi year funding 
allocations to the System;
? Develop an investment strategy for the 
replenishment mechanism (IFAR type of 
mechanism)
? Appoint 3-4 individuals, acting in their own 
capacity, to the Board of the new partnership 
(see next section on the New Partnership 
Board for details). 
The Council appoints a manager of the replenishment
fund whose main responsibility is to implement the
investment strategy of the Council; the fund manager
also supports the Donor Council in the execution of its
other responsibilities.
The Board of the new partnership
This Board is composed, in equal proportions, of not
more than 15 individuals appointed by the Donor
Council and the co-sponsors, the Centres and the
partners. These individuals are eminent personalities
who are engaged in Board issues for about 25% of
their time. They are not nominated to represent the
part of the System which nominated them, but to
provide their own eminent views on strategic issues.
To ensure that the Board has the overall balance of
skills needed to fulfil all its responsibilities, a
consultation mechanism between donors, centres and
partners is organised. 
Each individual on the Board is thus nominated by
either the Donor Council, or the 15 Centres or the
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partners. In the case of the partners, a reinvigorated
GFAR provides the appropriate platform to facilitate
this nomination.  The Chair of the Board is elected by
the members of the Board. The Chair is probably
engaged for 50% of her/his time in Board affairs.
Each individual on the Board is nominated for three
years and can be given a second mandate of three
years by the group which nominated him/her. 
A number of system level functions are assumed by
the Board. These are to:
? Allocate unrestricted funding to the three 
Strategic Objectives (in WG1 paper) and, 
within each Strategic Objective, to specific 
results that Centres undertake to produce; as a 
variant, three separate committees – one per 
Strategic Objective – make allocation 
recommendations to the Board;
? Facilitate joint strategic planning of the work of 
the Centres funded through the replenishment 
fund;
? Analyse best ways to rationalize the mandates 
of the Centres through joint strategic planning 
and the allocation of unrestricted funds; 
encourage and support research synergies 
through the formation of clusters of Centres;
? Design and implement an accountability 
mechanism that responds to the needs of the 
donors providing funds through the IFAR type 
of  mechanism;
? Appoint the independent Scientific Committee;
? Commission external reviews and regular 
assessments of results, since unrestricted 
funds are allocated for multiple years on the 
basis of expected results, as well as any other 
required scientific advice;
? Be accountable to donors, partners and 
Centres;
? Engage in system level fundraising for 
unrestricted resources;
? Conduct strategic planning and foresight 
('prospective') studies to provide overall 
guidance on priorities for the System, in the 
context of the international agricultural 
research landscape;
? Set common policies.
In addition to these new functions, the Board also
assumes functions currently dispersed within the
system. These are:
? Provision of common services such as 
communication and public awareness, finance, 
human resources, intellectual property…
? Brokering and coordination within the System.
The Board is supported by a CEO which it appoints,
and by a corporate office providing the necessary
back up for the implementation of all the Board
functions listed above. 
A Charter will lay out the authority and responsibilities
of the Board vis-à-vis those of the other parts of the
System.
The renewed system and its partners within the
international research for development 
landscape
The renewed System, with partners on the Board,
works in closer partnership with national research
institutions and universities, at both national and
international levels. This is a result of the Centres
having increasingly a role of catalyst and broker in the
international agricultural research scene, as indicated
in the paper produced by WG1.
The System interacts with a re-invigorated GFAR
through regular consultations organized during the
triennial GFAR Forum which replaces the yearly
AGM. GFAR facilitates the appointment of individuals
by partners on the Board of the new partnership. It
also facilitates regular consultations with regional fora
and advanced research institutions, in addition to
CSOs, private sector and farmers' organisations. 
The Centres
Centres delegate to the new partnership Board issues
regarding the rationalisation of mandates, the
authority for the setting of common policies and
administration of common functions and services.
Centres may therefore re-organise into clusters,
and/or engage in mergers, as per the analyses of the
Board. Furthermore, they jointly plan with the other
Centres those activities that are funded through the
IFAR type of mechanism. Finally, they implement the
strategic policies developed by the Board. 
In this scenario, restricted funds continue to be
allocated and managed as they are today. Centres
and their Boards are therefore directly accountable to
donors for the use of such funds. Centre Boards are
smaller in size, and focused on strategic scientific and
partnership issues, while retaining fiduciary
responsibility for Centres’ budgets. 
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DONOR COUNCIL
Donors providing unrestricted funds
NEW PARTNERSHIP BOARD
Donors+Centres+Partners+Co-sponsors
Functions:
? Allocation of unrestricted funds 
to the Centres
? Foresight and strategic planning
? Rationalization of mandates
? System level fundraising
? Encourage synergies / clusters
Functions:
? Agree on vision, Strategic Objectives
? Establishment of replenishment fund
? Oversight of replenishment fund
CENTRES
(15, and/or clusters, and/or less than 15)
Appoint 
members
Appoint 
members
Allocation 
of funds
Provide 
funds
The advantages of this scenario over the status quo
are:
? A simpler System, with a clear division of 
responsibilities between the Centres, the 
Board, the Donor Council 
? Greater participation of partners in resource 
allocation and strategic policy making for the 
Centres, resulting in greater buying-in
? Greater research synergies through joint 
planning of activities by Centres and through 
potential clusters and mergers
? Greater financial stability
? The New Partnership Board can establish 
strong incentives for collective action
? Less bureaucracy, less overall transaction 
costs which facilitates scientific innovation at 
the level of scientific teams 
? System level decisions and a conflict 
resolution mechanism through the Board
? Gradual increased integration by facilitating the 
formation of clusters of centres and of mergers
The weaknesses in this scenario are:
? This scenario addresses the need for changes 
in the System through the leveraging effect of 
unrestricted contributions; restricted funds are 
still allocated in the same manner as today 
and transaction costs continue to be incurred 
to manage them;
? There is a potential risk that the new 
partnership Board (depending upon the 
personalities on it) may push for an over 
centralised system, with the known adverse 
implications for nimble decisions and 
operations; mechanisms to forestall this 
potential risk would need to be put in place;
? By comparison with the other two scenarios, 
scenario A involves a less clear separation of 
responsibilities between donors and research 
actors in the CGIAR (the configuration of the 
"Partnership Board")
? Donors of restricted funds are not involved in 
system level discussions of issues; 
? Decreasing current levels of bureaucracy 
requires a full overhaul of all the parts of the 
System which currently do not directly produce 
science-based results, as well as implementing 
difficult changes in centre mandates which 
may lead to downsizing some parts of current 
scientific teams;
? Entrenched interests will resist such profound 
changes. 
3. Scenario B
The building blocks in this scenario are the same as
in scenario A, with the addition of an Agricultural
Research Alliance (ARA). As a consequence of this
addition, responsibilities among the building blocks
are shared differently than in scenario A. In scenario
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DIAGRAM 1.
Chair
Manager of IFAR
CEO & Corporate Office
Independent 
scientific
committee
B the Partnership Board and ARA share the
responsibilities that were all vested in the Board in
scenario A. This leads to a clearer division of
responsibilities between funding and operations.
Another difference is that Centres delegate a number
of responsibilities to ARA which, in scenario A, are
delegated to the Partnership Board. Diagram 2
provides a schematic representation.
Only the elements of the System which differ between
scenarios A and B are discussed below.
The Partnership Board
The composition of the Board is similar to that in
scenario A. However, given that the functions of the
Board are fewer than in scenario A, board members
and the Chair are engaged in board issues for a lower
percentage of their time than in scenario A.
The Board has the following functions:
? Provide a common vision and shared 
objectives for the System;
? Allocate unrestricted funds from the IFAR type 
of mechanism to the three Strategic Objectives 
(in WG 1 paper) through a transparent and 
equitable process;
? Decide upon the need and timing of external 
reviews of the System and of all its component 
parts;
? Provide incentives to rationalize the mandates 
of the Centres; this is essentially through the 
allocation of unrestricted funds to the Strategic 
Objectives;
? Appoint the independent Scientific Committee 
and draws its TORs;
? Commission external reviews and regular 
assessments of results, since unrestricted 
funds are allocated for multiple years on the 
basis of expected results, as well as any other 
required scientific advice;
? Be accountable to donors, partners and 
Centres. Each constituency in the System 
(donors, partners, centres) has clearly 
separate accountabilities. As a whole the 
system is accountable, through this Partnership 
Board
The Partnership Board is supported by a Secretary
whose main responsibilities are to prepare the
logistics of Board Meetings and provide the
necessary back up for the implementation of all the
Board functions listed above. 
A Charter will lay out the authority and responsibilities
of the Partnership Board vis-à-vis those of the other
parts of the System.
The Agricultural Research Alliance – ARA
This is a corporate entity and as such its composition
is determined by a legally binding contractual
agreement. ARA includes a lean corporate office and
a CEO whose responsibilities are to ensure the
delivery of all the functions below. As a legal entity, it
has its own Board which can include partners. ARA is
accountable to the Centres, and it facilitates
nomination by the Centres of individuals to the
Partnership Board.
Its functions are:
? Allocate unrestricted funds to expected results 
from the Centres on the basis of the 
allocations made by the Partnership Board to 
the three Strategic Objectives. Allocations are 
also guided by the assessment of results from 
the Independent Scientific Committee.
? Implement joint planning of the work of the 
Centres, when and where warranted.
? Engage in system level fundraising for 
unrestricted resources;
? Conduct strategic planning and foresight 
('prospective') studies to provide overall 
guidance on priorities for the System, in 
particular in the context of the international 
agricultural research landscape;
? Analyses the need for rationalizing the 
mandates of the Centres through joint strategic 
planning and the allocation of unrestricted 
funds; encourage and support research 
synergies through the formation of clusters of 
Centres
? Design and implement an accountability 
mechanism that responds to the needs of the 
donors providing funds through the IFAR type 
of mechanism
? Set common policies
? Provide common services such as 
communication and public awareness, finance, 
human resources, intellectual property…
? Encourage and support partners' active 
participation in all of the above, to ensure joint 
ownership, equal research partnerships, and 
greater relevance and impact of results.
? Brokering and coordination within the System
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The Centres
Centre Boards delegate to ARA the above functions,
including that of rationalising mandates when the
need occurs. Centres may therefore re-organise into
clusters, and/or engage in mergers, in answer to
ARAP's analyses and to 'signals' from the Partnership
Board. Furthermore, ARA, and through it
subsequently the Centres, take the IFAR resources
allocated through the Partnership Board and translate
them into operational plans and activities. Finally,
ARA and its constituent Centres develop and
implement the strategic policies that respond to
allocation (and other) decisions of the Partnership
Board.
In this scenario, as in scenario A, restricted funds
continue to be allocated and managed as they are
today. 
The advantages of this scenario, by comparison with
scenario A are:
? A clearer division of responsibilities between 
funding and operations
? A more balanced distribution of these 
responsibilities within the constituting elements 
of the System (and almost no risk of over 
centralisation)
? A stronger contribution of partners in the 
governance of the System, resulting in time in 
a renewed and broadened partnership base for 
the whole system, and in greater impacts on 
the ground. 
The main disadvantage of this scenario by
comparison with scenario A is that it is more complex
and may involve higher transaction costs, depending
upon the actual 'system mindset' of the different
building blocks.
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DONOR COUNCIL
Donors providing unrestricted funds
NEW PARTNERSHIP BOARD
Donors+Centres+Partners+Co-sponsors
Functions:
? Set common vision and strategic 
objectives
? Allocate unrestricted funds to the 
Strategic Objectives
? Signals for rationalization of mandates
? Monitors performance of all elements
in the system
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH
ALLIANCE
Functions:
? Allocates unrestricted funds to Centres
? Strategic planning, foresight 
? Joint planning
? Support collective action, facilitate 
research synergies
? Facilitate partners’ involvement in 
decision-making
? Fund raising at system level
? Common services
Functions:
? Agree on vision, Strategic Objectives
? Establishment of replenishment fund
? Oversight of replenishment fund
CENTRES
(15, and/or clusters, and/or less than 15)
Fund
replenishment
Appoint 
members
Allocation 
of funds
Funds
Authority
delegation
Accountability
DIAGRAM 2.
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4. Scenario C
In this scenario (Diagram 3) donors make all resource
allocation decisions and Centres interact with donors
directly and through a coordination and facilitation
mechanism (the Alliance).
The Donor Council
Decisions on the allocation of funds from the
replenishment, IFAR-type mechanism, are entirely
made by the Resource Allocation Committee in the
Donor Council. The Resource Allocation Committee
allocates unrestricted funds not only to the three
strategic objectives but to the Centres as well, on the
basis of expected results.
The Alliance Board
In this scenario the Board of the Alliance replaces the
Board of the new partnership, and it does not have
resource allocation responsibilities. Rather, it has
coordination and facilitation and implementation
functions, as the current Alliance does. It is made up
of individuals appointed by the Centres. It functions
like a clearinghouse. Limited responsibilities are
delegated to it by the Centres regarding mandates
and strategic policy making.
Potential clustering of Centres and mergers are
decided by individual Centres, under the incentives
provided by donors and the Resource Allocation
Committee and with encouragement and support by
the Alliance. It is expected that over time a smaller
number of Centres will emerge from the inter-centre
competition for unrestricted funds.
The main advantage by comparison with the other
two scenarios is a very clear division of
responsibilities between funders and providers.
Another advantage is that this scenario is not far
removed from the current situation. It will therefore be
easier to implement than scenarios A and B.
The main disadvantage – which may be seen as an
advantage by some – is that it is very similar to an
open market system, as the System was when it was
initially created with four Centres and a few donors.
As such, it does not provide greater focus than the
current system, and does not address issues of
repositioning the System globally, or simplifying the
System and its bureaucracy. 
In addition, this scenario does not comply very well
with the principle of subsidiarity since all funding
decisions regarding unrestricted allocations are
centralized within the Resource Allocation Committee.
Finally, the scenario does not institutionalise collective
action (another principle in the set of principles for
increasing effectiveness and impact); on the contrary,
individualistic behaviour is the norm. Research
synergies are therefore less important than in the
other two scenarios. Partners do not contribute to
overall governance anymore than they do today.
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DIAGRAM 3.
DONOR COUNCIL (All donors)
ALLIANCE BOARD (CEO and Corporate office)
CENTRES
(15, and/or clusters, and/or less than 15)
Accountability Allocation of funds
Reporting Transfer of funds
Coordination
For further information on the Alliance of 
CGIAR Centers contact:
Office of the Alliance of CGIAR Centers
c/o FAO
Via delle Terme di Caracalla
00153 Rome ITALY
+39 06 57052276
http://www.cgiar.org/centers/alliance.html
Resource Allocation Committee
(donors providing unrestricted funds):
allocates unrestricted funds
Manager of fund 
and Secretary
Science Council
and Secretary
